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Etudiants Sans Fronti res: Out-of-State
Tuition, The Right to Travel, and the
European Union
John J. Garman*
The medieval city was the classic type of closed town, a self-
sufficient unit, an exclusive Lilliputian native land. Crossing its
ramparts was like crossing one of the still serious frontiers in the
world today. You were free to thumb your nose at your neighbor
from the other side of the barrier. He could not touch you. The
peasant who uprooted himself from his land and arrived in the town
was immediately another man. He was free--or rather he had
abandoned a known and hated servitude for another, not always
guessing the extent of it beforehand. But this mattered little. If the
town had adopted him, he could snap his fingers when his lord called
for him.'
I. Introduction
This article will address the United States and European Union law
relating to the free movement of persons, with special attention to the
rights of students to study in other states without tuition discrimination.
Free movement is guaranteed by several provisions in the European
Union treaties2 and by a number of United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting Article IV and Amendment Fourteen of the
Constitution of the United States. For the purposes of this paper, the
term "free movement" as applied in the European Union will refer to the
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University. B.A. 1988, David Lipscomb College; J.D. 1991, Vanderbilt University;
LL.M. 2000, Universit6 de Droit, d'Economie et des Sciences d'Aix-Marseille. The
author wishes to thank Rhonda M. Garman (J.D. 2000, University of Tennessee) for her
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1. FERNAND BRAUDEL, IN CAPITALISM AND MATERIAL LIFE 1400-1800, 402-403
(Miriam Kochan trans. 1967).
2. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M 56
(1998) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. The provisions that deal with the free movement of
people are in Title III, "Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital."
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freedom of European Union citizens to travel, live and work within other
European Union member states. As applied to United States law, the
term "free movement" or "the right to travel" will refer to the right of
persons holding United States citizenship to travel, live and work, and
study in different states.
First, the article analyzes the development and current status of the
right to travel, especially in light of the United States Supreme Court's
1999 decision in Saenz v. Roe.3  The development of the European
Union's freedom of movement of persons is similarly described. Finally,
the article argues that the United States should adopt the European
Union's policy encouraging students to travel outside of their home
member-state to attend university, rather than the current discrimination
against out-of-state students.
II. Overview of Law of Free Movement
A. Right To Interstate Travel in the United States
1. Sources of the Right
The constitutional basis for the freedom of interstate travel in the
United States is less clear than the explicit provisions for the free
movement of persons in the European Union treaties. Because the
United States Constitution does not mention a "right to travel,"4 a direct
reference to the document itself is unavailable. Notwithstanding this
handicap, federal constitutional jurisprudence has, since the beginning of
the Republic, recognized this right of citizens to move freely from one
state to another. As discussed in detail in succeeding sections of this
paper, the United States Supreme Court has tapped one or more of a
number of provisions of the Constitution to serve as the foundation for a
citizen's right to travel interstate. Which provision or set of provisions
the Court chooses as the source of the right to cross over from one state
to another seems to depend upon the circumstances under which the right
is demanded.
3. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
4. Some have speculated that the right was so fundamental a part of our Nation as it
was conceived, that specific mention of it was unnecessary. See, e.g., United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
5. "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to
another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right,
ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is a right secured by
the 14th Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution." Williams v. Fears,
179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
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Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states:
The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes;...-And To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof
6
Roughly paralleling the European notion that free movement is necessary
to conduct business, this provision allocates power to the federal
government to restrict the power of states to erect barriers to interstate
commerce.
Article IV, Section 2 adds: "The Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States."7 Known as the "Privileges and Immunities Clause," Section 2 of
Article IV prevents a state from discriminating against non-residents.
The United States Supreme Court has held that it only operates with
respect to rights that are fundamental to national unity.
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor denZ to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
This Amendment contains three sub-sources for the right of interstate
travel: (1) the "Privilege or Immunities Clause," as it is tediously
called; 9 (2) the Due Process Clause; and (3) the Equal Protection Clause.
These foundations of the constitutional right of American citizens to
travel from one state to another without harassment were not created for,
or even always consistently recognized as, sources for the right of
interstate travel itself. Rather, over the course of the development of
constitutional and civil rights jurisprudence, as jurists looked to the
Constitution for the solutions to a new nation's ills, these became the
most oft-cited provisions supporting an American citizen's right to freely
travel without molestation at the hands of foreign States. To better
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18.
7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. Tedious because the "privileges or immunities" referred to in the Amendment,
as discussed in more detail herein, are of a different stripe than the "privileges and
immunities" of the Article IV variety.
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understand how United States law has arrived at its current position on
the subject, and to bring clarity to a comparison of the law of an
American citizen's right to interstate travel and the European Union's
freedom of movement of persons, a study of the historical development
of the U.S. citizen's right to interstate travel is instructive.
2. Historical Development of Right To Travel Jurisprudence
Following the declaration of peace between the United States and
Great Britain in 1783, ° the Congress and the King set out to normalize
their relations and strengthen their "true and sincere friendship."" The
Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain was, by
its terms, "a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation," which
proclaimed the intent of the parties to put aside their differences so as to,
among other things, "regulate the commerce and navigation between
their respective countries, territories and people, in such a manner as to
render the same reciprocally beneficial and satisfactory."'1 2 Commerce
and navigation was addressed in the fourteenth article of the Treaty:
There shall be between all the dominions of his Majesty in Europe
and the territories of the United States, a reciprocal and perfect liberty
of commerce and navigation. The people and inhabitants of the two
countries respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely, and
without hindrance and molestation, to come with their ships and
cargoes to the lands, countries, cities, ports, places and rivers, within
the dominions and territories aforesaid, to enter into the same, to
resort there, and to remain and reside there, without any limitation of
time. Also to hire and possess houses and ware-houses for the
purposes of their commerce, and generally the merchants and traders
on each side, shall enjoy the most complete protection and security
for their commerce; but subject always as to what respects this article
to the laws and statutes of the two countries respectively.
13
The leaders of the post-Revolution colonies sought protection
against external aggression through a formal association of the colonies,
but also saw the wisdom of creating a more harmonious coalition among
10. DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND HIS
BRITANNIC MAJESTY, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 80 art. 7 ("There shall be a firm
and perpetual peace between his Britannic Majesty and the said States, and between the
subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore all hostilities, both by sea and
land, shall from henceforth cease .... ).
11. THE TREATY OF AMITY, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, BETWEEN His BRITANNIC
MAJESTY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THEIR
SENATE, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 116 art. 1.
12. Id. at pmbl.
13. Id. at art. 14.
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the States. 14 Thus, by the Articles of Confederation, the States formed a
league for their common defense, the security of their liberty, and their
mutual and general welfare. 15 Moreover, there was created a new brand
of unity in the United States of America:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different states in this union, the free
inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of
each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other
state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as
the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restriction
shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported
into any state, to any other state, of which the Owner is an inhabitant;
provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by
any state, on the property of the united states, or either of them.
16
Despite their many mutual goals, the leaders of the infant nation
found themselves dealing with jealous States still hesitant to loosen their
grip on old parochial philosophies. Under the Articles of Confederation,
the powers of the sovereign States were limited only as specified in the
Articles, and the only express limitation on State power under the
Articles 17 dealt with State interference with the national government's
dealings with foreign countries. 18 The temptation for self-preservation
by the States, and the local interests of the citizens residing within their
borders, caused the development of such conflicting and hostile local
legislation as threatened to cause the degeneration of the union so hard-
won in the Revolution. 19 It was against this backdrop, realizing the
14. Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 607 (1860).
15. U.S. Art. of Confed. art. III (March 1, 1781).
16. U.S. Art. of Confed. art. IV, § 1 (March 1, 1781).
17. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 393-394 (1849) [hereinafter The Passenger
Cases].
18. The Sixth Article, section 3 provided: "No state shall lay any imposts or duties,
which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the United States in
congress assembled, with any king, prince or state, in pursuance of any treaties already
proposed by congress, to the courts of France and Spain." U.S. Art. of Confed. art. VI,
§3.
19. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 394. Justice Catron's description of the intent
of the Constitution as to commerce among the states is likewise instructive:
Before the Constitution existed, the States taxed the commerce and intercourse
of each other. This was the leading cause of abandoning the Confederation and
forming the Constitution,-more than all other causes it led to the result; and
the provision prohibiting the States from laying any duty on imports or exports,
and the one which declares that vessels bound to or from one State shall not be
obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another, were especially intended to
2004]
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defects in the confederation as then organized,2° that the leaders set out to
"form a more perfect union., 21 The Constitution of the United States
was completed on September 17, 1787.22
Soon, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with
disputes arising out of State overreaching as citizens of one state
attempted to cross boundaries into another. In 1849, the master of a
British ship who had been required under a New York statute to pay over
one dollar for each of the 290 steerage passengers landed at the port of
New York, complained that the statute was an attempt by the State to
regulate commerce. 23 "Commerce," said one justice, encompassed not
only "an exchange of commerce," but included "navigation and
intercourse.' 24 As such, it was beyond question that the transportation of
25passengers was a part of commerce.
prevent the evil. Around our extensive seaboard, on our great lakes, and
through our great rivers, this protection is relied on against State assumption
and State interference. Throughout the Union, our vessels of every description
go free and unrestrained, regardless of State authority. They enter at pleasure,
depart at pleasure, and pay no duties. Steamboats pass for thousands of miles
on rivers that are State boundaries, not knowing nor regarding in whose
jurisdiction they are, claiming protection under these provisions of the
Constitution. If they did not exist, such vessels might be harassed by
insupportable exactions. If it be the true meaning of the Constitution, that a
State can evade them by declaring that the master may be taxed in regard to
passengers, on the mere assertion that he shall have a remedy over against the
passengers, citizens and aliens, and that the State may assess the amount of tax
at discretion, then the old evil will be revived, as the States may tax at every
town and village where a vessel of any kind lands. They may tax on the
assumption of self-defence, or on any other assumption, and raise a revenue
from others, and thereby exempt their own inhabitants from taxation.
Id. at 445-446 (opinion of Justice Catron).
20. Hon. Robert Yates, Notes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention of
1787 (May 25, 1787), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, at 746 (Charles C. Tansill, ed. 1927) ("His excellency
Governor Randolph, a member from Virginia, got up, and in a long and elaborate speech,
showed the defects in the system of the present federal government as totally inadequate
to the peace, safety, and security of the confederation, and the absolute necessity of a
more energetic government."). Id.
21. WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for
the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
22. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
23. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 393. The Court was first faced with deciding
whether the power of Congress to regulate commerce was an exclusive one. Id. Having
decided in the affirmative, the Court could then take on the issue whether the New York
law was an infringement on Congress's exclusive power. Id. at 400.
24. Id. at 401.
25. Id. The Court cited the Constitution as inferential support of this proposition,
[Vol. 23:2
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The State of Nevada likewise sought to levy a tax on every person
leaving the State by railroad or stage coach.26 The validity of the tax had
been tested in the lower courts against two provisions of the
Constitution: Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 (the "Commerce Clause");
and Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 (prohibiting States from laying
imposts or duties on imports or exports except as provided).27 The Court
refused to be limited in its decision by these two constitutional
provisions alone, choosing instead to expand its reasoning to encompass
the very essence of the Republic born out of that document:
The people of these United States constitute one nation. They have a
government in which all of them are deeply interested. This
government has necessarily a capital established by law, where its
principal operations are conducted.... That government has a right
to call to this point any or all of its citizens to aid in its service, as
members of the Congress, of the courts, of the executive departments,
and to fill all its other offices; and this right cannot be made to
depend upon the pleasure of a State over whose territory they must
pass to reach the point where these services must be rendered.
But if the government has these rights on her own account, the citizen
also has correlative rights.... He has a right to free access to its sea-
ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and
commerce are conducted,... and this right is in its nature
saying "[t]he provision of the Constitution, that 'the migration or importation of such
persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit shall not be
prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808,' is a restriction on the general power of
Congress to regulate commerce." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1). The Court
continued, "As a branch of commerce, the transportation of passengers has always given
a profitable employment to our ships, and within a few years past has required an amount
of tonnage nearly equal to that of imported merchandise." Id.
The constitutionality of a second, similar Massachusetts law under consideration in
the Passenger Cases depended, in the view of a dissenting Justice on the Court, not on
whether the State was regulating commerce in violation of an exclusive grant of power to
Congress, but on whether Congress was infringing on the sovereignty of the State in
forcing it to accept alien passengers on its shores. Id. at 465 (Justice Taney, dissenting).
The States should not, he opined, have to sacrifice the opportunity to prevent from
coming to mingle and reside among its citizens any person "whom it may deem
dangerous or injurious to the interests and welfare of its citizens." Id. at 467.
Justice Taney was in fact hard-pressed to find any imposition on Congress's
commerce power in the Massachusetts law: "Undoubtedly, vessels engaged in the
transportation of passengers from foreign countries... are a part of the commerce of the
country.... But the law of Massachusetts now in question does not in any respect
attempt to regulate this trade or impose burdens upon it." Id. at 473.
26. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 39 (1867).
27. Id. at 40-41.
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independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in
the exercise of it.
28
Having completed its brief detour into lessons of civics, the Court
returned to connect the principles outlined to the issue of the tax under
consideration. A State cannot, it concluded, lay a tax that burdens the
exercise of a federal power.29 If a State could tax the means of
transportation by which a citizen might be called upon to serve the
federal government, or by which he might seek redress from it, then a
State could tax other instruments used by the federal government to
execute its powers. 30 Further, if a State may levy a tax of one dollar, it
may levy a tax of one thousand dollars.3 ' If one State may so tax, every
State may do so, thereby "totally prevent[ing] or seriously burden[ing]
all transportation of passengers from one part of the country to the
other."32  Thus, the Crandall Court recognized "the right of passing
through a State by a citizen of the United States" as "one guaranteed to
him by the Constitution.,
33
In Paul v. Virginia, the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute that
favored domestic insurance corporations over foreign ones against a
constitutional challenge based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, Section 2.3 Despite its holding that a corporation was not
a "citizen" for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Court nevertheless provided a valuable lesson on the purpose of that
section that has remained relevant to the constitutional right to interstate
travel:
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the
28. Id. at 43-44. The Court decided the case without the benefit of oral or written
submission by the plaintiff in error. Id. at 39. Interestingly, the opinion includes a
statement of the Court's regret over this state of affairs, perhaps offering some insight
into its careful focus on the individual citizen's rights in this battle of state versus federal
power. Id.
29. Id. at 44-45.
30. Id. at 46. For example, "They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may
tax patent rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house; they may tax judicial
process; they may tax all the means employed by the government to an excess which
would defeat all the ends of government." Id.
31. Id.
32. Crandall, 73 U.S. at 46.
33. Id. at 47.
34. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177 (1868). The statute was also challenged under
the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8. Id. In holding that the statute did not
violate the Commerce Clause, the Court stated that "[ilssuing a policy of insurance is not
a transaction of commerce." Id. at 183. The Court would overrule this holding in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-553 (1944), but Congress
quickly returned control over the insurance industry to the States by enacting the
McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (1945)). See, e.g., United States Dept.
of Treas. v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1993).
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citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those
States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of
alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against
them by other States; it gives them the right offree ingress into other
States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the
same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the
acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of
happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection
of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the
Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the
United States one people as this.
3
The Louisiana State Legislature passed a statute in 1869 attempting
to give to a handful of incorporators a monopoly on livestock and
slaughter-house operations, against which statute challenges were
brought by individuals and entities that would be prohibited by its
operation from engaging in their trade. 36 In The Slaughter-House Cases
the Court would, for the first time, construe the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution in answering the accusations that the statute:
(1) abridged the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens; (2) denied to
citizens the equal protection of the laws; and (3) deprived citizens of
their property without due process of law.37
35. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added). So essential was the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to the Constitution, the Court maintained, its function touched the
very nature of the nation itself:
Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each
State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of
privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted
little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union
which now exists.
Id. See also Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 254 (1898) (Tennessee statute held
unconstitutional because it gave priority to resident creditors of insolvent debtors over
those creditors residing elsewhere). In Blake, the Court noted that the privileges and
immunities protected by Article IV, Section 2 included "the right of a citizen of one State
to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce,
trade, or business without molestation." Id. at 251 (quoting Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S.
418, 430 (1870)). Here, however, the Blake Court opens the door to allow states leeway
to regulate its local affairs, conceding that such local regulation would not be hostile to
the fundamental rights of non-resident citizens. Id. at 256. Based on the character of the
examples given in its explanation, i.e., residence requirements for the privileges of
suffrage or eligibility for elective office, the Court would not allow State infringement of
that broader category of "rights that commonly appertain to those who are part of the
political community known as the People of the United States, by and for whom the
government of the Union was ordained and established." Id. at 256-257.
36. The Butchers' Ben. Assoc. of New Orl. v. The Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. 36 (1872) [hereinafter The Slaughter-House
Cases].
37. Id. at 66-67. The challengers also cited the Thirteenth Amendment to the
2004]
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The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment had set out a
pronounced distinction between citizenship of the United States and
citizenship of a State,38 at last putting to rest the theoretical debates in
legal circles as to the definitions of the two political conditions.
39
Seizing on this distinction, the Court proceeded in its analysis of the
privileges and immunities issue to place the rights allegedly violated by
the Louisiana statute into the appropriate classification. 40  The rights
guaranteed to the citizens of the several States included such as were
Constitution against involuntary servitude in support of their allegation that the statute
was unconstitutional. Id. This provision of the Constitution is not relevant to the present
discussion, and therefore will not be discussed in this essay. However, The Slaughter-
House Cases Court viewed as acutely relevant the historical context in which both the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted:
The proclamation of President Lincoln expressed an accomplished fact as to a
large portion of the insurrectionary districts, when he declared slavery
abolished in them all. But the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-
establishing the authority of the Federal government were not content to permit
this great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest or the
proclamation of the Executive, both of which might have been questioned in
after times, and they determined to place this main and most valuable result in
the Constitution of the restored Union as one of its fundamental articles. Hence
the thirteenth article of amendment of that instrument....
... [N]otwithstanding the formal recognition by those States of the abolition of
slavery, the condition of the slave race would, without further protection of the
Federal government, be almost as bad as it was before ....
These circumstances ... forced upon the statesmen.., the conviction that
something more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the
unfortunate race who had suffered so much. They accordingly passed through
Congress the proposition for the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 68, 70.
The framers of the Amendment also accomplished a second objective in specifying
that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States ... are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." Id. at 73. According to the Court, the
Amendment was to overturn Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), which held that
negro slaves were not-and could never become-citizens of the United States. The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73.
38. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73.
39. Id. at 72.
40. Id. at 74. The Court noted that the phrase "privileges and immunities" was first
used in the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 75. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2, while omitting much of the language included in the superseded
Articles, had an identical purpose and was meant to refer to the same set of privileges and
immunities. Id. Justice Miller, writing for the Court, stated:
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights,
as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify,
or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall
be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.
Id. at 77.
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fundamental: government protection, acquisition and possession of
property, and the pursuit of happiness.4 ' In contrast, a proper case for the
Fourteenth Amendment would be one in which there had been an
infringement of a citizen's right to bring a claim to the federal
government, serve in its offices, seek its protection, or conduct business
with it.42 A citizen may seek refuge in the Fourteenth Amendment for
protection of her right to peaceably assemble, use the country's
navigable waterways, become a citizen of a State, or vote.43 Thus, the
Court concluded that the privileges or immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment were those of citizens of the United States, as
distinguished from the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States.44 Accordingly, the state law at issue did not invoke the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In his dissent, Justice Field maintained that the Amendment
expressly recognized citizens of the United States solely by virtue of "the
place of their birth, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the
constitution or laws of any State or the condition of their ancestry.
45
Rather than a sort of separate, horizontal existence as a State citizen and
a United States citizen, Justice Field interpreted the provision as
describing characteristics of a more vertical, dependent status: "A
citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States residing in
that State. ' ' 6 This meant that those privileges and immunities enjoyed
by citizens, while necessarily affected by state and local laws, were
guaranteed to the people by the umbrella of federal government
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.47 Article IV, Section 2 did
not reference different rights; it merely served to protect "citizens of one
State against hostile and discriminating legislation of other States," while
the Fourteenth Amendment provided the same protection to "every
citizen of the United States against hostile and discriminating legislation
against him in favor of others, whether they reside in the same or in
different States. 48
Justice Bradley, in his forceful dissent, maintained that
41. Id. at 76 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)).
42. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79 (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
35, 44 (1867).
43. Id. at 79-80.
44. Id. at 78.
45. Id. at 95 (Justice Field, dissenting).
46. Id. Justice Bradley agreed on this point, saying that "citizenship of the United
States is the primary citizenship in this country; and State citizenship is secondary and
derivative, depending upon citizenship of the United States and the citizen's place of
residence." Id. at 112 (Justice Bradley, dissenting).
47. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 95-96.
48. Id. at 100-101.
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The states have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their
citizenship to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States
has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he
chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights
with every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged
to sustain him in that right. He is not bound to cringe to any superior,
or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights
and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.49
The Due Process argument "having not been much pressed" by the
plaintiffs, the Court simply concluded that both state and federal law
were devoid of any construction of the Due Process Clause that would
render the Louisiana statute unconstitutional.50  Likewise, the Court
carried the claim under the Equal Protection Clause no farther than to say
that the provision had "clearly" been included to remedy the injustice
and hardship borne by recently freed slaves, and it refused to press the
issue beyond that scope absen.a "strong case.",
5
'
49. Id. at 112-113.
50. Id. at 80-81. On the other hand, where persons are prohibited from engaging in
lawful employment, according to dissenting Justice Bradley, they have been deprived of
both liberty and property. Id. at 122 (Justice Bradley, dissenting). A person's right to
choose his trade is his liberty, and his occupation is his property. Id. Justice Field's
dissent, though examining the question under the Fourteenth Amendment and labeling it
the "right of free labor," also suggested his belief in a property right in one's individual
labor:
"The property which every man has in his own labor," says Adam Smith, ...
as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and
inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of
his own hands; and to hinder him from employing his strength and dexterity in
what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the
just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ
him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders
the others from employing whom they think proper."
Id. at 110 n.39 (Justice Field, dissenting) (quoting Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, b. 1,
ch. 10, part 2).
51. Id. at 81. Here again, Justice Bradley disagreed with this narrow construction of
the Amendment to apply only to circumstances surrounding slavery and its victims.
Instead, the provision was intended for a much broader purpose:
The mischief to be remedied was not merely slavery and its incidents and
consequences; but that spirit of insubordination and disloyalty to the National
government which had troubled the country for so many years in some of the
States, and that intolerance of free speech and free discussion which often
rendered life and property insecure, and led to much unequal legislation. The
amendment was an attempt to give voice to the strong National yearning for
that time and that condition of things, in which American citizenship should be
a sure guaranty of safety, and in which every citizen of the United States might
stand erect on every portion of its soil, in the full enjoyment of every right and
privilege belonging to a freeman, without fear of violence or molestation.
Id. at 123 (Justice Bradley, dissenting). Likewise, Justice Swayne opined, "Labor is
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As the Nation grew, so did the demands of a growing population.
By 1941, California had experienced large numbers of migrants,52 and it
had endeavored to control the numbers of indigent persons moving to the
State by passing a statute making involvement in bringing an indigent
into the State a misdemeanor.53 In this determination, according to the
Court in Edwards v. State, California had crossed the line. 54 There were
boundaries to a State's police power, and California had overstepped
them in its attempt to prohibit the transportation of persons across its
borders.55 To allow such insular behavior was to invite retaliation from
property, and as such merits protection." Id. at 127 (Justice Swayne, dissenting).
In observing the philosophical tug-of-war that has taken place since the beginning of
the Republic in the name of constitutional construction of civil rights, it is indeed
tempting to query what of human nature causes one citizen to see it proper to demand
such different rights for himself than those his neighbor may find justly deserved.
Perhaps the post-Revolution Amendments evidenced a federal government struggling
against states which, while desirous of freedom from England's tyranny, nonetheless had
an irresistible lust for a similar power over those who would be, in some form or another,
"slaves." Justice Swayne would not be so cynical, believing instead that the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted once "the public mind became
satisfied that there was less danger of tyranny in the head than of anarchy and tyranny in
the members." Id. at 128. Still, in the face of the notion that "citizens of the United
States" could mean all citizens, and by "any person" might have been intended "all
persons," he found himself answering to those alarmed by such a notion:
It is objected that the power conferred is novel and large. The answer is that
the novelty was known and the measure deliberately adopted. The power is
beneficent in its nature, and cannot be abused. It is such as should exist in
every well-ordered system of polity. Where could it be more appropriately
lodged than in the hands to which it is confided? It is necessary to enable the
government of the nation to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights
and privileges enumerated, which, according to the plainest considerations of
reason and justice and the fundamental principles of the social compact, all are
entitled to enjoy. Without such authority any government claiming to be
national is glaringly defective. The construction adopted by the majority of my
brethren is, in my judgment, much too narrow. It defeats, by a limitation not
anticipated, the intent of those by whom the instrument was framed and of
those by whom it was adopted. To the extent of that limitation it turns, as it
were, what was meant for bread into a stone. By the Constitution, as it stood
before the war, ample protection was given against oppression by the Union,
but little was given against wrong and oppression by the States. That want was
intended to be supplied by this amendment.
Id. at 129 (Justice Swayne, dissenting).
In truth, we may be witnessing the ongoing battle between the concept of the nation
our forefathers set out to create and the governed, who fear total equality-perhaps even
hate it-lest in the dead of night some group steal the upper hand of power and leave the
rest powerless and in servitude. This fear of equality leaves us with a society in which
the boundaries of an individual's fundamental rights must remain subject to erasure and
adjustment.
52. Edwards v. State, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941).
53. Id. at 171.
54. Id. at 173.
55. Id.
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other states, as well as cause a mass of legislative enactments that would
prove impossible for a citizen to comprehend. 56
The Edwards Court relied on the Commerce Clause as support for
its holding.57 Concurring in the result while expressing no opinion on the
Court's reasoning, Justice Douglas wrote separately to express his view
that "the right of persons to move freely from State to State occupies a
more protected position in our constitutional system than does the
movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines. 58 According
to Justice Douglas, the privilege of interstate travel was a right incident
to national citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
state interference.59
In Toomer v. Witsell,60 a South Carolina regulation charging out-of-
state fishermen one hundred times more than residents for a commercial
shrimp license was held invalid under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2.61 Once again, the Court cited the
importance of a unified United States and a citizen's right to freely
journey throughout the country and interact with its citizens: 62
The primary purpose of this clause ... was to help fuse into one
Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States. By its very
design, this clause ensures to a citizen of State A who ventures into
State B the exact privileges enjoyed by the citizens of State B.... In
line with this underlying purpose, it was long ago decided that one of
the privileges which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is
that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with
the citizens of that State.
63
For the first time, however, the Court introduced a new test into the
privileges and immunities analysis, saying that there must be a
"substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they
56. Id. at 176.
57. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177.
58. Id. at 177 (Justice Douglas, concurring).
59. Id. at 178. Justice Jackson agreed with Justice Douglas on this point. Id. at 182
(Justice Jackson, concurring). In his view,
This Court should ... hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of the
United States, protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the Union,
either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence
therein and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof. If national citizenship
means less than this, it means nothing. Id. at 183.
60. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
61. Id. at 403.
62. Id. at 395. The plaintiffs also cited the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but because the Court decided the case on Article IV, Section 2 grounds, it
did not pass on the Fourteenth Amendment question. Id. at 403.
63. Id. at 395-396 (citations omitted).
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are citizens of other States."64  In some cases, it suggested,
discrimination against non-residents could be justifiable; thus, said the
Court, "the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such
reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close
relation to them."
65
Two decades later, in Shapiro v. Thompson,66 the Court rejected the
State's showing of a rational relationship between the one-year waiting
period to qualify for welfare benefits and its stated objectives.67 "[I]n
moving from State to State ... appellees were exercising a constitutional
right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling government
interest, is unconstitutional. 68 In a footnote that would ripen into one of
the most relied upon authorities for a State's right to charge higher
tuition to non-residents, the Shapiro Court declared:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free
education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish,
and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling state
interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon
the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.
69
The Court later admitted that it had not made clear in Shapiro the
amount of impact on the right to travel that would give rise to its highest
level of scrutiny.7° The requisite impact, it recalled, had been referenced
in Shapiro in two different ways: (1) whether the waiting period would
deter migration; 7' and (2) the extent to which the exercise of the right to
64. Id. at 396.
65. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396. This would include the State's interest in governing
locally: "The inquiry must also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the principal
that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in
prescribing appropriate cures." Id.
66. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
67. Id. at 634. The State argued that controlling the influx of indigents helped to
preserve the fiscal integrity of state public assistance programs. Id. at 627. The Shapiro
Court remained inclined to allow States the latitude they needed to manage their affairs,
recognizing the State's need to preserve its fiscal integrity even to the point of limiting
expenditures on public assistance programs. Id. at 633. They could not do so, however,
by way of invidious discrimination. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added). The constitutional challenge in Shapiro was brought
under the Equal Protection Clause, not the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2 or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 626. The Court, in denying the need to ascribe a specific constitutional source of the
right to interstate travel, noted that a variety of provisions had been tapped as the
foundations of the right. Id. at 630 & n.8.
69. Id.at638n.21.
70. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-257 (1974).
71. See infra, note 74.
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travel had been burdened.72 The Court interpreted its holding in Shapiro
to include the proposition that "denial of the basic 'necessities of life"'
was a penalty on interstate travel, pointing out that it had declined to
strike down state statutes with residence requirements as a condition of
lower tuition at state institutions of higher education.73
Shapiro would be the first of a number of "waiting period" or
residence requirement cases serving to feed the federal right to travel
jurisprudence. Dunn v. Blumstein74 held that "durational residence laws
must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are
unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are
'necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest."'' 75  A
residence requirement may violate the Constitution even if its effects
may be intrastate in nature.76
In Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm 'n,7 7 the high Court
rejected an Article IV, Section 2 Privileges and Immunities claim
because the statute at issue, which governed recreational big-game
hunting, did not involve "those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing
72. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 257.
73. Id. at 259. Even after recognizing its lack of clarity in Shapiro, it is unclear
whether the Court's opinion in Maricopa County was enlightening as to the issue. After
its discussion of the degree of deterrence on the right to travel and an introduction to its
discussion of the extent of the penalty on that right, the Court seemingly threw up its
hands and concluded that, "Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty
analysis, it is at least clear that medical care is as much 'a basic necessity of life' to an
indigent as welfare assistance." Id. (citations omitted).
74. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). The issue in Dunn was the legality of
a Tennessee statute requiring citizens wishing to vote to have resided in the State for the
previous year, and their county of residence for the prior three months. Id. at 331. The
plaintiff challenged the statute on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 331-332.
75. Id. at 342 (citation omitted). In response to the State's argument that its voting
statute neither sought to nor actually deterred travel, the Court held that the potency of
the deterrent to travel was irrelevant to the question of a citizen's right to demand
protection of that privilege. Id. at 339. A State cannot "impose a penalty upon those who
exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Constitutional rights would be of little
value if they could be indirectly denied." Id. at 341 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 540 (1965) citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)).
76. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250. The Court in Maricopa County held
unconstitutional an Arizona statute requiring a year's residence in a county prior to
receiving non-emergency hospital care at the county's expense. Id. at 251. The Court
refused to accept the appellees' argument that the statute at issue was only intrastate in
nature, even though the appellant had not actually moved out of the state, saying instead
that the appellant had been "effectively penalized for his interstate migration." Id. at 256.
"What would be unconstitutional if done directly by the State can no more readily be
accomplished by a county at the State's direction." Id.
77. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). Here, the
Court was faced with constitutionality of a Montana statute charging non-residents higher
rates to obtain hunting licenses. Id. at 373.
[Vol. 23:2
ETUDIANTS SANS FRONTItRES
upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity. 78
The same year as its decision in Baldwin, the United States Supreme
Court in Hicklin v. Orbeck79 struck down, on Article IV, Section 2
grounds, an Alaska statute Which required that Alaska residents be given
precedence in hiring over non-residents for positions in the construction
of the Alaska Pipeline.80 The Court found ample support for its holding
in prior decisions that held violative of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause state laws discriminating against non-residents "seeking to ply
their trade, practice their occupation, or pursue a common calling within
the State."'"
The most recent example of the United States Supreme Court
defending the right of free movement throughout the United States is
Saenz v. Roe.82 Saenz was a challenge to California's social welfare
payment system designed to discourage out-of-state welfare applicants
from traveling to California seeking higher benefits. 83 The challenged
statute limited the welfare benefits received by newcomers to California
to the amount of the benefit in the state of their prior residence.84
The Saenz Court summarized the development of the constitutional
right of travel, concluding that it has three different components.85 First,
persons have the right of movement across state lines-ingress and
regress-without impediment. 86  The second is derived from the
Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United
States Constitution, reaching the "citizen of one State who travels in
other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey., 87 The
third component of the freedom of interstate travel is "the right of the
newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by
other citizens of the same State. 88
78. Id. at 383. Thus, "[e]quality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the
maintenance or well-being of the Union." Id. at 388.
79. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
80. Id. at 526.
81. Id. at 524. "[T]he clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right
of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of
engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation." Id. at 525
(quoting Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 430 (1870)).
82. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
83. Id. at 493.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 500.
86. Id. at 501.
87. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502. In this category, non-residents are protected who enter a
State for such purposes as "to obtain employment, to procure medical services, or even to
engage in commercial shrimp fishing." Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 502. The Fourteenth Amendment is meant to protect this category of
citizens. Id. at 503.
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3. Non-Resident Tuition and Right to Travel Jurisprudence
As previously mentioned, the Court's footnote in Shapiro v.
Thompson89 resurfaced in Kirk v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal.90
when an Ohio resident challenged California's durational residence
requirement on the grounds that it burdened her constitutional right of
interstate travel. Taking its cue from the United States Supreme Court,
the California Court of Appeal expounded the reasons the statute was not
constitutionally infirm.
91
It is important to note that the court did not hold that the residence
requirement promoted a compelling state interest, but instead held that
the requirement did not infringe upon the petitioner's right of interstate
travel.92  Why? To explain, the Court engaged in an exercise of
"[c]arrying the petitioner's argument to its logical conclusion" and
examining "the consequence of the durational residence requirement.,
93
The issue arose in the first instance because the petitioner, a female
student residing in Ohio, married a California resident and wished to
change her residence and live with her new husband. 94 Turning the case
on its head, the court rationalized that it would be ridiculous to imagine
that someone might marry a resident of a State only to secure one year's
worth of in-state tuition.95 Relying on this conclusion, the appellate court
held that the requirement did not "deter any appreciable number of
persons from marrying California residents, 96 and simply latched onto
its holding that it was also not a burden on a citizen's right to travel.97
This point did not end the court's analysis, however. Continuing,
the court explained that its holding would differ from that in Shapiro
because it could not equate the attainment of education with that of food,
clothing and shelter.98  Thus, proceeding in its appraisal of the
consequences of the durational residence requirement at issue, the court
painted the grim picture of great suffering and loss of life that could
result from a residence requirement for eligibility for welfare benefits,
such as that in Shapiro, as compared to a milder outcome developing as a
result of the same requirement as a qualification for in-state tuition.99
89. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21.
90. Kirk v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 439 (1969).
91. Id. at 439-440.
92. Id. at 441.
93. Id. at 440.
94. Id. at 433.




99. Id. See also Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), aff'd per
curiam, 401 U.S. 985 (1971). In Starns, the United States District Court for the District
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The California statute was still to be tested under the rational basis
test to determine whether the State's classification was rationally related
to a legitimate state purpose.00 The State justified the higher non-
resident tuition to the Court's satisfaction, on the basis that it helped to




of Minnesota held that the State of Minnesota could impose a residence requirement on
students to be eligible for a lower in-state tuition rate at public universities. Id. at 241.
The only issue in Starns was the constitutionality of a regulation creating an irrefutable
presumption of non-residence for any student who had not continuously resided in
Minnesota for one year prior to attending the University of Minnesota. Id. at 237. The
Minnesota district court found no infringement of any fundamental right. Id. at 238.
Taking its cue from the Kirk court, the district court reasoned that, because the effect of
the regulation was not to "deny the basic necessities of life," there was "less
likelihood... that the one-year waiting period to acquire resident status for tuition
purposes would make a person hesitate when deciding to establish residency in
Minnesota and to apply to the University." Id.
100. Kirk, 273 Cal. App. 2d at 441.
101. Id. at 444-445. Noting that there was "no way for this court to determine the
degree to which the higher tuition charge equalizes the educational cost of residents
attending the university," id. at 444, the court gives no indication as to the required
showing, if any, that the State must produce to satisfy the rational basis test. It simply
concedes that "it appears to be a reasonable attempt to achieve a partial cost equalization
by collecting lower tuition fees from those persons who, directly or indirectly, have
recently made some contribution to the economy of the state .... Id. See also Starns,
326 F. Supp. at 241, where the district court held
This state has a valid interest in providing tuition-free education to those who
have demonstrated by a year's residence a bona fide intention of remaining
here and who, by reason of that education, will be prepared to make a greater
contribution to the state's economy and future. Accordingly, we hold that the
regulation classifying students as residents or nonresidents for tuition purposes
is not arbitrary or unreasonable and bears a rational limitation to California's
objective and purpose of financing, operating and maintaining its many
publicly financed educational institutions of higher learning.
We believe that once the law affords recognition to the right of a State to
discriminate in tuition charges between a resident and nonresident, that right to
discriminate may be applied reasonably to the end that a person retains a non-
resident classification for tuition purposes until he has completed a twelve-
month period of domicile within the State. We believe that the State of
Minnesota has the right to say that those new residents of the State shall make
some contribution, tangible or intangible, towards the State's welfare for a
period of twelve months before becoming entitled to enjoy the same privileges
as long-term residents possess to attend the University at a reduced resident's
fee. Accordingly, we hold that the regulation requiring a one-year domicile
within the State to acquire resident classification for tuition purposes at the
University is constitutionally valid.
Id.
Another irrefutable presumption failed a constitutional challenge in Vlandis v. Kline,
but this one was a permanent presumption. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
In other words, if a student was a non-resident when he applied to the University of
Connecticut, he would be considered a non-resident for as long as he remained a student.
Id. at 443. Such a presumption was violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
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Over the years, citizens have endeavored to convince the high Court
that education itself is a fundamental right that should be protected by the
Constitution. The plea has yet to succeed, as it did not in San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez.10 2 Education is not explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution, and thus the Court would not subject a
Texas education funding statute to strict judicial scrutiny. 10 3  In many
Amendment because the student is denied any opportunity to show that he is a bona fide
resident entitled to in-state tuition rates. Id. at 452. The Court distinguished this case
from Starns, saying that under the regulation at issue in the latter case, a student could
rebut the presumption by showing he was a bona fide resident of the State. Id. at 453 n.9.
102. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Rodriguez was a
class action on behalf of school children of minority groups who were poor and who
lived in Texas school districts having a low property tax. Id. at 4. At issue was the
State's system of financing the public education system, which the plaintiffs claimed
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection guarantees. Id.
103. Id. at 33 ("Thus, the key to discovering whether education is 'fundamental' ...
lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution"). See also id. at 35 ("Education, of course, is not among the rights
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for
saying it is implicitly so protected.").
The appellees in Rodriguez argued further that education, being so closely
interrelated to other rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution, should be afforded
the status of a fundamental constitutional right. Id. at 35. For example, a citizen's
freedom of speech is trifling without sufficient education to articulate her thoughts
intelligently and receive information proficiently. Id. An informed electorate depends on
a citizen's capacity to seek and use the information needed to make an enlightened
choice. Id. at 35-36.
The appellees enjoyed the agreement of dissenting Justice Marshall on this point. In
stark disagreement with the majority, Justice Marshall would establish a "nexus" test,
under which interests not specifically mentioned in the Constitution would be examined
to determine whether they were dependent on constitutionally protected interests. Id. at
102 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under this test, as the nexus between the non-
constitutional interest and the constitutionally protected one grew closer, the right grew
more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny it deserved grew higher. Id. at 102-
103. So inspected, the right to education would be undeniably fundamental, since
education directly affects the ability of a citizen to exercise such constitutional rights as
freedom of speech, freedom of association and engaging in the American political
process. Id. at 112-113.
To agree with this proposition, responded the majority, would be to overstep its
authority:
Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or authority to
guarantee to the citizeznry the most effective speech or the most informed
electoral choice. That these may be desirable goals of a system of freedom of
expression and of a representative form of government is not to be doubted.
But they are not values to be implemented by judicial instruction into otherwise
legitimate state activities.
Id. at 36.
Current statistics still support the statement made by Justice Marshall in Rodriguez
that there is a "direct relationship between participation in the electoral process and level
of educational attainment." Id. at 114 (citation omitted). See EDUCATION AND SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION BRANCH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE
ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2002, http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-552.pdf (last
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cases, while holding that there exists no constitutional right to education,
the Court takes great pains in expressing the high esteem in which it
holds public education.' 
04
States have justified their non-resident tuition rates by arguing that
charging out of state students more to attend state universities helps
visited on July 28, 2004).
104. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29-30. See also, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982) (Texas statute denying undocumented alien school-age children free public
education):
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the Constitution. But
neither is it merely some governmental "benefit" indistinguishable from other
forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in
maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on
the life of the child, mark the distinction. The "American people have always
regarded education and the acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme
importance." We have recognized "the public schools as a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government," and as
the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values on which our society rests."
"[A]s... pointed out early in our history,... some degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our
open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence." And
these historic "perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been
confirmed by the observations of social scientists." In addition, education
provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically
productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant
social costs bome by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to
absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (citations omitted).
See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972):
[S]ome degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve
freedom and independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be self-
reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We accept these propositions.
However, the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case is persuasively to
the effect that an additional one or two years of formal high school for Amish
children in place of their long-established program of informal vocational
education would do little to serve those interests. Respondents' experts
testified at trial, without challenge, that the value of all education must be
assessed in terms of its capacity to prepare the child for life. It is one thing to
say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may
be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modem
society as the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be
viewed as the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian
community that is the keystone of the Amish faith.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221-222. The Court likely did not intend to interject this flexibility
into the analysis of the value of education. With the nation's economy becoming more
dependent on its ability to maintain a global reach, and its very place in the world judged
in part by its technological and scientific superiority, the necessity of a higher education
becomes more and more an unavoidable reality. It is difficult to imagine that the Court
would not arrive at the eventual conclusion that a higher education is so vital to the
nation's existence that it is, indeed, a fundamental right.
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equalize the cost of public higher education between residents and non-
residents.' °5 To date, the courts have recognized the States' interest in
protecting the right of its own residents to attend public institutions of
higher learning at preferential rates. 10 6 They may use reasonable criteria
to determine in-state status so as to "make virtually certain that students
who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State, but who have come
there solely for educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-
state rates."'10 7 There is no burden on a citizen's right to interstate travel,
the Supreme Court maintains, because "any person is free to move to a
state and to establish residence there."'
10 8
Is the United States still on the right track with its constitutional
right to travel jurisprudence, given our Nation's heritage? Or could we
learn something about the concept of "united states" and unity of purpose
from the European Union?
B. Free Movement in the European Union
1. History of the European Union
In the aftermath of World War II, Europe was in ruins-millions
had died, millions more were homeless, the means of economic
production on the continent had been virtually destroyed. The
predecessors to the European Union were conceived from the broken
nation's efforts to reconstruct its former markets and return itself to
viability.
The two prime movers behind early European integration were
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, who served
in the French civil service. 109 In May 1950, Schuman declared that "the
French Government proposes to take action immediately on one limited
but decisive point. It proposes to place Franco-German production of
coal and steel as a whole under a common higher authority within the
framework of an organization open to the participation of the other
105. Vandis, 412 U.S. at 449; Starnes, 326 F. Supp. at 240; Kirk, 273 Cal. App. 2d at
443-444. States have also tried to argue that they were entitled to favor long-time
residents over new residents because of their past tax contributions. Viandis, 412 U.S. at
449. This argument fails, however, as to follow such reasoning "would permit the State
to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its
citizens. The Equal Protection clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services."
E.g., Viandis. at 450 n.6 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 632-633).
106. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 327 (1983).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 328-329.
109. JAMEs HANLON, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 2-3 (2d ed. 2000).
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countries of Europe."11 0
The result of the efforts of Monnet and Schuman was the Treaty of
Paris, signed in 1951 by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg which created the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was designed to put the
instruments of war making, i.e., coal and steel, under a High Authority
which would be a supernational independent body which would have
control over the production, pricing, subsidy, and distribution of coal and
steel. It would be impossible for the contracting parties to make war
against each other if the ECSC had the power to allocate these
resources. "'
The next major steps toward the creation of the European Union
were taken in 1957 with the signing of two Treaties of Rome which
created the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) 1 2 and
the European Economic Community (EEC)." 3 At that time "atomic"
energy was seen as the power for the future, so this was a logical
extension of the control of the war-making ability of the member states.
The EEC took integration beyond mere control of the elements of war-
its purpose was to establish a "Common Market" within the six member
states-trade without internal borders as well as a customs union
(common external tariffs). 14
In 1993 the Treaty of Rome creating the EEC was renamed the
Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC); dropping the label
"Economic" symbolized the political and monetary integration of the
community. At the same time the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
(TEU) added provisions on common foreign and security policy as well
as justice and home affairs.' 15
The geographic scope of the European Union has continued to grow
since its formation by the original six countries in 1951. The United
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EEC in 1973. Greece joined
in 1981, and Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. 1995 saw the addition
of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Finally, 2004 brought the admission of
ten new countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta. Bulgaria and Romania
will likely join in 2007, and Turkey is poised to join in the future. The
110. Id.
111. Id. at3.
112. Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1957).
113. Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25,
1957, 3 B.D.I.E.L 3 (1957).
114. Treaty Establishing The European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 56
(1998) art. 4 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
115. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) art. 11, 29.
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European Union has now grown to a population in excess of 450 million
people. 116
2. Free Movement in the European Union-Treaty Provisions
The free movement of persons is guaranteed by several provisions
in the Treaty establishing the European Community. The basic principle
of freedom of movement for European Union workers is established in
Article 39 (formerly Article 48):
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the
Community.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of
work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds
of public policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this
purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in
accordance with the provisions governing the employment of
nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having
been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall
be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn up by the
Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the
public service .117
While Article 39 explicitly applies to "workers," other provisions in
the treaties create much broader rights of free movement. First, Article
14 (formerly Article 7a) states:
116. See Europa: Activities of the European Union Enlargement, In brief at
http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/enlarg/indexen.htm (last visited on June 30, 2004).
117. EC Treaty art. 39.
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1. The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of
progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring
on 31 December 1992, in accordance with the provisions of this
Article and of Articles 15, 26, 47(2), 49, 80, 93 and 95 and without
prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty.
2. The internal market shall comprise an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission, shall determine the guidelines and conditions necessary
to ensure balanced progress in all the sectors concerned.
118
Second, Article 18(1) (formerly Article 8(a)) states that:
"Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the
limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the
measures adopted to give it effect.
''119
Third, Article 61 states:
In order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and
justice, the Council shall adopt:
(a) within a period of five years after the entry into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam, measures aimed at ensuring the free
movement of persons in accordance with Article 14, in
conjunction with directly related flanking measures with respect
to external border controls, asylum and immigration, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 62(2) and (3) and
Article 63(l)(a) and (2)(a), and measures to prevent and combat
crime in accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e) of the
Treaty on European Union. 1
20
In addition to these treaty provisions, the freedom of movement has
been augmented by European Union legislation. For example, Article
7(1) and (2) of Regulation12' No 1612/68 state:
118. Id. at art. 14.
119. Id. atart. 18(1).
120. Id. at art. 61.
121. EC Treaty art. 249 (ex art. 189) provides that:
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council
and the Commission shall make regulations and issue directives, take decisions,
make recommendations or deliver opinions. A regulation shall have general
application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all
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1. A worker who is a national of a Member State may not, in the
territory of another Member State, be treated differently from
national workers by reason of his nationality in respect of any
conditions of employment and work, in particular as regards
remuneration, dismissal, and, should he become unemployed,
reinstatement or re-employment;
He shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national
workers. 1
22
Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1612/68 provides:
The following shall, irrespective of their nationality, have the right to
install themselves with a worker who is a national of one Member
State and who is employed in the territory of another Member State:
(a) his spouse and their descendants who are under the age of 21
years or who are dependents;
(b) dependent relatives in the ascending line of the worker and
his spouse."'
123
3. Free Movement of Persons In Cases Before The European
Court of Justice
A frequent issue in the case law of the European Court of Justice
has been the reluctance of member-states to grant residence permits to
new arrivals. In Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, a British woman
married to a non-European Union national was working part time in
Holland but had not worked for over a year when she was refused a
residence permit by the Dutch authorities. 24 She argued that she had
sufficient funds to support both herself and her husband, but the Dutch
authorities maintained that her income from her work was inadequate.
25
The European Court of Justice held that the amount of the wage is
irrelevant to the status of a worker, and that all that was required was that
the work was an activity of an economic nature. 126 Rejecting the Dutch
authorities' argument that Levin had taken a job solely for the purpose of
obtaining a residence permit, the Court held that her motives were
Member States. Id.
122. Council Regulation 1612/68, art. 7(1-2), 1968 O.J. (L 257).
123. Id. at art. 10(1).
124. Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1982 E.C.R. 1035.
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id. at 14.
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irrelevant, so long as she was pursuing a genuine and effective economic
activity.
127
In Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, the European Court of
Justice extended its narrow holding in Levin even further, stating that
even if a person's wages are so low that he must rely on state
supplementary benefits to survive, he is still entitled to a residence
permit. 128 Mr. Kempf was a German national living in the Netherlands
whose only source of income was derived from giving music lessons for
twelve hours per week. The Court held that it was "irrelevant whether
those supplementary means of subsistence are derived.., from financial
assistance drawn from the public funds of the Member State in which he
resides. ,129
In contrast to the right of interstate travel in the United States,
however, the freedom to remain in a foreign member state for an
undetermined amount of time is not unlimited. Consider Ex parte
Antonissen, where a Belgian national came to the United Kingdom to
seek work, but after three years of unemployment and a drug offense
conviction, the Secretary of State sought to deport him. 130 The European
Court of Justice held that Article 48 (now Article 39) gives European
Union citizens not only the right to enter and move freely in the host
state, but also the right to stay there while seeking employment.' 3 ' The
Court added that a Member State may deport a migrant if he has not
found work within a reasonable time, unless there is some evidence that
genuine opportunity to find work actually exists. 
132
In Cristini v. Societe nationale des chemins de fer francais, the
Italian widow of an Italian working in France was denied reduced rail
fare tickets, even though the discounts would be given to the widow of a
French railroad worker. 133 The European Court of Justice rejected the
arguments of the French national railroad and held that the equality of
treatment provisions in Article 7(a) (now Article 14134) applied to all tax
and social advantages, even those, as in this case, which arose by
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement.' 
35
Discrimination against other member state nationals in the area of
tax and social advantages is forbidden, even when those advantages are
127. Id. at 23.
128. Case 139/85, Kempfv. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1986 E.C.R. 1741, 16.
129. Id. at 14.
130. Case C-292/89, Ex parte Antonissen, 1991 E.C.R. 1-745.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Id. at 21.
133. Case 32/75, Cristini v. Societe nationale des chemins de fer francais, 1975
E.C.R. 1085.
134. EC Treaty art. 14.
135. ExParteAntonissen, E.C.R. 1-745, 13.
2004]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
completely unconnected to employment. In Bernini v. Minister van
Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, the European Court of Justice held that
educational grants paid to the children of workers was a "social
advantage" and as such, was protected by the nondiscrimination
provisions of Article 7(a) (now Article 14136).137 In Ministere Pub. v.
Even, the Court stated that "the advantages which this regulation extends
to workers who are nationals of other Member states are all those which,
whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally granted
to national workers primarily because of their objective status as workers
or by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national
territory. ,138
In Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Wurttemberg, an Italian
worker challenged the German government's policy of extending
childbirth loans only to German citizens. 139 The European Court of
Justice held that since the purpose of the loan was to assist low income
families, it was considered a social advantage under Article 7(a) (now
Article 14), despite the German government's argument that the loan had
nothing to do with the free movement of workers. 40 The government
claimed that the policy was designed to promote its demographic policy
instead, but the Court rejected this view.14 1
Unlike the similar "freedom of interstate travel" in the United
States, "freedom of movement of persons" permits Member States in the
European Union to refuse permanent resident status to other European
citizens in certain cases. Three grounds for refusal are laid out in Article
39142 (formerly Article 48), which states that freedom of movement is
"subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public
security or public health.. . ." These grounds have been the subject of a
long series of decisions which go beyond the scope of this paper, but
even in some cases not involving the three grounds for refusal, the
European Court of Justice has been willing to allow discrimination
against European Union citizens from other Member States.
In an April 2000 decision, the European Court of Justice took a
restrictive view of the freedom of movement of persons. At issue in
Arben Kaba v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, was a United
Kingdom immigration law. 143 Kaba was a Yugoslav national who had
136. EC Treaty art. 14.
137. Case C-3/90, Bernini v. Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, 1992 E.C.R.
1-1071, 29.
138. Case 207/78, Ministere Pub. v. Even, 1979 E.C.R. 2019, 22.
139. Case 65/81, Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Wurttemberg, 1982 E.C.R. 33.
140. Id. at 18.
141. Id. at 14.
142. EC Treaty art. 39(3).
143. Case C-356/98, Arben Kaba v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, 2000
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entered the United Kingdom illegally on August 5, 1991. In February
1992 he applied for asylum, and on May 4, 1994 he married a French
national. In November 1994 Kaba's spouse obtained a five-year
residence permit for the United Kingdom as a European Union national,
and, as the spouse of a European citizen, Kaba was granted leave to
remain in the United Kingdom for the same period. On January 23,
1996, Kaba applied for indefinite leave to remain in the United
Kingdom, but the Secretary of State for the Home Department rejected
his application. Upholding the denial, the Court stated:
As Community law stands at present, the right of nationals of a
Member State to reside in another Member State is not unconditional.
That situation derives, first, from the provisions on the free
movement of persons contained in Title III of Part Three of the EC
Treaty and the secondary legislation adopted to give them effect and,
second, from the provisions of Part Two of the EC Treaty, and more
particularly Article 8a of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment,
Article 18 EC), which, whilst granting citizens of the Union the right
to move and reside freely within the Member States, expressly refers
to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and by the
measures adopted to give it effect.144
Finally, the Court held:
Accordingly, the Member States are entitled to rely on any objective
difference there may be between their own nationals and those of
other Member States when they lay down the conditions under which
leave to remain indefinitely in their territory is to be granted to the
spouses of such persons.145
4. Rights of non-member state students in the European Union
European Union students have the right to undertake university
studies in other member states without paying higher tuition fees than
students of the host member state, based on the right to equal treatment
and the right of free movement under European Union law.1 46 Some
examples from the European Union are instructive: Oxford University
undergraduate students from the United Kingdom and other European
E.C.R. 1-2623.
144. Id. at T 30.
145. Id. at 31.
146. Going beyond non-discrimination, the European Union actively encourages
university students to study in other member states. See, e.g., http://europa.eu.int/comml/
education/_programmes/socrates/erasmus/erasmus-en.html (last visited on June 30,
2004). Cite gives a description of the SOCRATES, ERASMUS and European Credit
Transfer System programs.
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Union member states pay a (means-tested) maximum of £1,125, while
non-EU tuition fees range from £8,170 to £19,970 depending on the
course of study.14 7 In France, tuition fees at public institutions for all
students (including non-EU citizens) are low, ranging from £130 to £780,
depending on the course of study.148 In Germany, no tuition fees are
charged at public institutions of higher learning other than semester fees,
which are generally less than £100.149 In Ireland and Sweden, no tuition
fees are charged at all.' 5° At the University of Twente in the Netherlands
the 2005-06 tuition fee for EU students is £1476, while the non-EU rate
will be "at least" E8,100.1'1
5. Development of the Law of Free Movement for University
Students In the European Court of Justice
The case of Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Minchen,152 while not
directly addressing the issue of university studies, laid the groundwork
for later cases. Donato Casagrande was an Italian citizen living in
Germany with his Italian father who held the status of "worker" under
EC law. 53 Casagrande attended secondary school in Munich and applied
for an educational grant of 70dm per month, pursuant to Bavarian law.
154
The German authorities refused to pay the grant and, as a result,
Casagrande brought an action claiming a violation of the Community
right to free movement.
55
Casagrande's claim was based upon Article 12 of Regulation
1612/68, which requires that
the children of a national of a Member State who is or has been
employed in the territory of another Member State shall be admitted
to that state's general educational, apprenticeship and vocational
training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of that
state, if such children are residing in its territory', and Member States
147. http://www.admissions.ox.ac.uk/finance/ (last visited on June 30, 2004).
148. http://www.france.org.sg/scac/en/edu/study-money.htm (last visited on June 30,
2004).
149. http://www.ottawa.diplo.de/en/06/Studieren in Deutschland/Studieren in_
Deutschland.html (last visited on June 30, 2004).
150. http://www.cfsontario.calpolicy/factsheets/fs-200301-tuitionfees.pdf (last visited
on June 30, 2004); http://www.sweden.se/templates/SISCommonPage-4962.asp (last
visited on June 30, 2004).
151. http://graduate.utwente.nl/education/finance/tuitionfeesfor_2004.doc/ (last
visited -n June 30, 2004).
152. Case 9/74, Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Miinchen, 1974 E.C.R. 773, 2
C.M.L.R. 423 (1974).





are required to encourage 'all efforts to enable such children to attend
these courses under the best possible conditions.1
56
Thus, the Court held that providing educational opportunities to the
children of all member states under the "same conditions" meant that
member states could not favor children of their own nationals in either
school admissions or on "general measures intended to facilitate
educational attendance," such as educational grants.
57
The European Court of Justice directly faced the issue of post-
secondary education in Forcheri v. Belgian State.'58 Mrs. Forchieri, an
Italian citizen, was the wife of an official of the European Communities
working in Brussels.' 59 She enrolled at the Institut Sup6rieur de Sciences
Humaines Appliqu6es-Ecole Ouvrire Sup6rieure (a school which
trains students to become social workers) for a three year course of
study.' 60  Belgian law required non-Belgians whose parents did not
reside in Belgium to pay an enrollment fee-in her case, 19,995 Belgian
francs for the 1979-80 academic year and 21,723 Belgian francs for the
1980-81 academic year' 6 -in addition to the enrollment fees paid by
Belgian students. 162 This additional fee for foreign students was charged
by all educational institutions subsidized by the Belgian government.
63
The court held that the additional fee was invalid under Section 7 of the
EC Treaty because it discriminated on the grounds of nationality.' 64 But
this holding was limited to vocational training, not general university
studies not designed to lead to a specific career.
In Gravier v. City of Liege,165 the court examined the case of
Francoise Gravier, a French national who, in 1982, moved to Liege,
Belgium to study strip cartoon art at the Academie Royale des Beaux-
Arts, which is a four-year course of higher art education. 166 The Belgian
government charged foreign art students an enrollment fee of 24,622
Belgian francs; 167 Gravier requested that she be exempt from the fee, but
the Academie Royale informed her that "all foreign students must be
156. Casagrande, 1974 E.C.R. 773at 5.
157 Id. at 9.
158. Case 152/82, Forcheri v. Belgian State, 1983 E.C.R. 2323, 1 C.M.L.R. 334
(1984).
159. Id. at 337.
160. Id.
161. Approximately C495.66 and C538.50 respectively. As of July 29, 2004, 1 Euro
(P) is w-rth approximately $1.20.
162. Forcheri, 1 C.M.L.R. at 337.
163. Id.
164 Id. at 345.
165. Case 293/83, Gravier v. City of Liege, 1985 E.C.R. 593, 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (1985).
166. ld. at 5.
167. Approximately E610.36.
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aware that such education is not free of charge and must anticipate
payment of an enrollment fee." 168 Gravier was asked to pay the fees for
the 1982-83 and 1983-84 school years, but because she did not pay in
time, her Belgian residence permit was not extended.1 69  She then
brought an action requesting an exemption from the fee and extension of
her residence permit to stay in Belgium. 70
The Tribunal de Premiere Instance in Liege asked the European
Court of Justice for a ruling on following issues: 1) whether nationals of
member states who enter another member state solely for the purpose of
vocational training fall within the scope of Article 7 of the Treaty of
Rome, and 2) if so, what criterion would be used to decide whether a
course on strip cartoon art would fall within the scope of the treaty. 171
The court first noted that "although educational organization and
policy are not as such included in the spheres which the Treaty has
entrusted to the Community institutions, access to and participation in
courses of instruction and apprenticeship, in particular vocational
training, are not unconnected with Community law."' 17 2  Prior EC
legislation had made it clear that when workers moved to another
member state, they were to be treated equally with regard to vocational
training. 173 But here, Gravier had traveled to Belgium to be a student,
not a worker.
The court held that access to vocational training is likely to foster
free movement of persons, and that "the conditions of access to
vocational training fall within the scope of the Treaty."' 174 The court laid
down a broad rule to determine whether a particular program should
come within the scope of the Treaty:
It follows from those statements that any form of education which
prepares for a qualification for a particular profession, trade or
employment or which provides the necessary training and skills for
such a profession, trade or employment is vocational training,
whatever the age and the level of training of the pupils or students,
and even if the training programme includes an element of general
education. The answer to the second question must consequently be
that the term "vocational training" includes courses in strip cartoon
art provided by an institution of higher art education where that
168. Gravier, 3 C.M.L.R. at 5.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 9.
172. Id. at 19.
173. Council Regulation 1612/68, art. 7, 1968 O.J. (1257), provides that workers
who are working in another member state must have the same access to vocational
training under the same conditions as national workers.
174. Id. at 24-25.
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institution prepares students for a qualification for a particular
profession, trade or employment or provides them with the skills
necessary for such a profession, trade or employment.'
75
The ECJ amplified its holding of Gravier in the case of Blaizot v.
University of Li~ge.'76 The plaintiffs in Blaizot were French nationals
studying veterinary medicine in Belgium who were required to pay a
"minerval," an annual registration fee, which was not required of Belgian
students. 177 The President of the Tribunal de Premiere Instance, Liege
referred the case to the ECJ to determine whether veterinary studies fell
within the scope of EC Treaty. 7  The Court held that university
education in veterinary medicine came within the definition of vocational
training, so that a minerval imposed on students pursuing that course,
who were nationals of other Member States, amounted to discrimination
on grounds of nationality contrary to EC Treaty Art. 7 (now Art. 14).
171
Reaffirming its holding in Gravier, the court held that
any form of education which prepares for a qualification for a
particular profession, trade or employment or which provides the
necessary training and skills for such a profession, trade or
employment is vocational training, whatever the age and level of
training of the pupils or students, and even if the training programme
includes an element of general education.
180
The far-reaching holdings of Gravier and Blaizot were narrowed in
1988 in Lair v. University of Hannover.'81  Sylvie Lair was a
Frenchwoman who had lived in Germany for some eight years before
beginning a degree course in Romance and Teutonic languages and
literature at the University of Hannover.182  German law allowed
foreigners to receive student maintenance grants after five years of
employment in Germany, but Lair had long periods of unemployment
during her residency and did not meet the five year requirement. 83 Lair
challenged the denial of the maintenance grant in the local administrative
court, which referred the matter to the European Court of Justice.
84
175 Id. at 30-31.
176. Case 24/86, Blaizot v. University of Liege, 1988 E.C.R. 379, 1 C.M.L.R. 57
(1989).
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id. at 36.
180. Id. at 15.
181. Case 39/86, Lair v. University of Hannover, 1988 E.C.R. 3161, 3 C.M.L.R. 545
(1989).
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 1-2.
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There were two issues before the ECJ:
(1) Does Community law entitle nationals of Member States of the
European Community who take up employment in another
Member State and there, after giving up their employment,
commence a course of higher education leading to a professional
qualification (in this case, a university course in Romance and
Germanic languages and literature) to claim a training grant on
the same basis of aptitude and need as that social advantage is
accorded to nationals of the host Member State?
(2) Does the fact that a Member State accords grants for higher
education leading to vocational qualifications to its own
nationals on the basis of aptitude and need but accords the same
grant to nationals of other Member States only if they have
worked in the host Member State for at least five years before
the start of the course concerned constitute discrimination
contrary to Article 7 of the EEC Treaty?
185
The court dealt with the second question first-that is, whether
maintenance grants made to students fall within the ambit of Article 7.
The court noted, as it did in Gravier, that educational policy was
generally not included in the spheres of competence of EC law, so it held
that
The answer to the second question must therefore be that at the
present stage of development of Community law the first paragraph
of Article 7 of the EEC Treaty applies to assistance for maintenance
and training given by a Member State to its nationals for the purposes
of university studies only in so far as such assistance is intended to
cover registration and other fees, in particular tuition fees, charged
for access to education!
86
But the court then turned to the concept of "social advantage."
Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68 requires member states to provide
"the same social.. . advantages as national workers' in the host member-
state." The court stated that this right includes "the possibility of
improving his living and working conditions and promoting his social
advancement" and therefore includes the pursuit of university studies
which, like here, would lead to a professional qualification.' 87 The court
held that grants to students who had some previous occupational activity
in that member state would retain their status as a "worker" and would be
entitled to the same benefits as nationals of that member state, "provided
185. Id. at 8.
186. Lair, 3 C.M.L.R. at 16.
187. Id. at 20.
[Vol. 23:2
ETUiDIANTS SANS FRONTItRES
that there is a link between the previous occupational activity and the
studies in question."' 88 But, the court carved out an exception to this rule
for students like Ms. Lair-if the periods of unemployment were
involuntary, the court said, and the worker was "obliged by conditions on
the job market to undertake occupational retraining in another field of
activity" she may still be allowed a maintenance grant, in spite of a lack
of nexus between the previous occupational activity and the current
course of university studies. 89 Finally, the court held that the host
member-state could not impose a minimum period of prior occupational
activity within that state for eligibility for maintenance grants. 190
Another example of the court taking a more restricted view of
freedom of movement for university students is found in Brown v.
Secretary of State for Scotland.191 Brown held dual citizenship of France
and England and had lived in France for many years. 192 He applied for,
but was refused, a grant from the Scottish education department, despite
the fact that he had worked for eight months in the United Kingdom
before entering the Scottish university.193 The European Court of Justice
held that Brown was not entitled to a Scottish grant since his prior work
in the United Kingdom was merely "ancillary" to his program at the
University. This holding contradicts the Court's earlier holding in Levin
that the motive for working in a Member State was irrelevant. 194
The holding in Brown has not survived. As the previous cases have
shown, the right for European Union students to study in other member
states without tuition discrimination has become well established. The
more recent cases do not question the issue of tuition discrimination
against students from other member states; rather, they are focused on
the right of a student from another member state to receive state support
while studying. In Grzelczyk v. Centre Public D'Aide Social
D'Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve,195 a French national moved to Belgium
to study physical education at the Catholic University of Louvain.
196
During his first three years in Louvain, he supported himself with various
jobs and loans. 197 But at the beginning of his fourth year of study, he
applied for the local Public Social Assistance Agency for payment of the
188. Id. at 44.
189. Id. at 37.
190. Id. at 44.
191. Case 197/86, Brown v. Secretary of State for Scotland, 1988 E.C.R. 3205.
192. Id. at 3.
193. Id. at 3-4.
194. Id. at 27.
195. Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public D'Aide Social D'Ottignies-Louvain-
La-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. 1-6193, 1 C.M.L.R. 19 (2002).
196. Id. at 10.
197. Id.
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"minimex," a subsistence payment from the government.19" He told the
agency that his father was unemployed and his mother was seriously ill,
so they could not assume the cost of his education. 99
Even though some previous cases had held that assistance to
university students fell outside the scope of the EEC Treaty, the Treaty
on European Union introduced the notion of European citizenship, and
brought with it the right to "non-contributory" benefits, such as the
minimex. 200 The court held that the payment of such benefits could not
be conditioned on the status of the student as a "worker" under prior ECJ
law.20'
III. Conclusion
"The right to travel throughout the Nation has been recognized for
over a century in the decisions of [the United States Supreme] Court.
But the concept of that right has not been static.
202
"The Constitution was framed.., upon the theory that the peoples
of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division., 20 3 The cases set
out herein, under the laws of both the United States and the European
Union, demonstrate a historically similar struggle. Both jurisdictions
have felt the tension between, on the one hand, the need to protect the
citizenry within the borders of the various sovereign states and, on the
other, the demands for equality inherent in a nation of separates yearning
to be unified. The struggle has produced admirable results, without
question; the boundaries have blurred, and the citizens seem no worse for
the wear. What, then, should be the goal?
A nation is only as strong as the sum of its parts. Compare the
journey of an older, more experienced Europe to the footprints of the
maturing United States. If ever a group of individual sovereigns ought to
think twice about perforating borders and introducing interstate equality,
it would logically have been the nations of Europe. Cultural
heterogeneity, differing currencies, and diverse languages aside, the
leaders of the European Union pursued their vision of a safer, stronger
whole where individuals were seen as equal members.
In contrast, the future inhabitants of a burgeoning adolescent nation,
straining against the grip of English rule, yearned simply for personal
198. Id. at 11.
199. Grzelczyk, 2001 E.C.R. at A3.
200. Id. at 46.
201. Id. at R1.
202. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 280 (1974) (Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting).
203. Edwards v. State, 314 U.S. 160, 173-174 (1941).
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freedom, egalitarianism, and national accord. Her members declared
themselves "free inhabitants" and "free citizens" of the several states,
making known their intent for "mutual friendship and intercourse"
among themselves as such, and agreeing at the outset that "free ingress
and regress" would be granted to and from one state to another.2 °4
Growing pains brought an even stronger resolve to form "a more perfect
Union", including the establishment of justice, insurance of domestic
peace, provision of a national defense, promotion of the general welfare,
and security of liberty.20 5 The states have never overcome the temptation
for self-preservation, however, and this short-sightedness has weakened
the fabric of the nation.
An Alabamian not restrained by a shrinking bank account for
having sought a college education in Pennsylvania would experience the
freedom the Founding Fathers intended so long ago. She would cross
several state borders unimpeded, free to follow her personal calling, and
would truly enjoy the same privileges and immunities as resident
Pennsylvanians. Her interstate adventure would force universities to
compete for the best students nationwide, causing the entire system of
higher education to become stronger. Stronger schools produce smarter
and more resourceful graduates, thus enriching the citizenry of the
nation.
In our capitalist society, the notion of competition among public
universities may be one whose time will yet come. The question is
whether such a state of affairs will be brought about because of the self-
interest of politicians, the financial desperation of states or something
else. If it comes as a reaction to some burdensome circumstance rather
than as part of a plan of growth and of strengthening the nation, then it
comes too late. By then, we as a people will have missed out on one of
our best opportunities to empower the citizen-building blocks of this
country to fortify it for the future.
204. U.S. Art. of Confed. art. IV, § 1.
205. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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